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Abstract
The performance of disease surveillance systems is evaluated and monitored using a diverse set of
statistical analyses throughout each stage of surveillance implementation. An overview of their main
elements is presented, with a specific emphasis on syndromic surveillance directed to outbreak
detection in resource-limited settings. Statistical analyses are proposed for three implementation
stages: planning, early implementation, and consolidation. Data sources and collection procedures
are described for each analysis.
During the planning and pilot stages, we propose to estimate the average data collection, data entry
and data distribution time. This information can be collected by surveillance systems themselves or
through specially designed surveys. During the initial implementation stage, epidemiologists should
study the completeness and timeliness of the reporting, and describe thoroughly the population
surveyed and the epidemiology of the health events recorded. Additional data collection processes
or external data streams are often necessary to assess reporting completeness and other
indicators. Once data collection processes are operating in a timely and stable manner, analyses of
surveillance data should expand to establish baseline rates and detect aberrations. External
investigations can be used to evaluate whether abnormally increased case frequency corresponds
to a true outbreak, and thereby establish the sensitivity and specificity of aberration detection
algorithms.
Statistical methods for disease surveillance have focused mainly on the performance of outbreak
detection algorithms without sufficient attention to the data quality and representativeness, two
factors that are especially important in developing countries. It is important to assess data quality
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at each state of implementation using a diverse mix of data sources and analytical methods. Careful,
close monitoring of selected indicators is needed to evaluate whether systems are reaching their
proposed goals at each stage.
Background
Most analyses performed with data from disease surveil-
lance systems focus on establishing baseline disease rates
and testing outbreak detection algorithms [1,2]. Another
outcome commonly evaluated is the timeliness of data
reporting [3]. However, the performance of disease sur-
veillance systems also needs to be evaluated and moni-
tored during other stages of surveillance implementation.
For example, outbreak detection algorithms often need to
adapt to systematic variations in the frequency of condi-
tions under surveillance [4]. Therefore, it is meaningful to
understand and incorporate the seasonal or day-of-week
variability in the caseload in order to implement outbreak
detection algorithms that can better respond to these var-
iations. Thus, a diverse set of data collection processes and
statistical analyses should be implemented and continu-
ously used to monitor and evaluate surveillance systems.
In developing countries, surveillance is often conducted
in the context of more limited resources than in devel-
oped settings, frequently lacking appropriate computer
systems and laboratory diagnostic capabilities, and with-
out sufficient numbers of well-trained physicians [5]. Syn-
dromic surveillance has thus emerged as an alternative to
the lack of physicians and laboratory diagnostics, and in
some cases is based on monitoring the frequency of
patients' signs and symptoms instead of relying on clinical
or laboratory-confirmed diagnosis [6]. The introduction
of syndromic surveillance in developing countries has
also met with increased need for more comprehensive sta-
tistical analysis of the information generated, as less is
known about the characteristics and behavior of the data
streams used in these novel surveillance approaches. We
present a brief overview of selected key statistical proce-
dures proposed for different stages of the implementation
of epidemiological surveillance systems. Proposed analy-
ses have been classified according to three implementa-
tion stages: planning, early implementation and
consolidation. Specific emphasis is placed on statistical
analyses needed for syndromic surveillance systems
implemented in resource-limited settings aiming at early
warning and outbreak detection.
The statistical procedures proposed in this paper were
developed and applied between 2000 and 2006 during
the planning stages and implementation of Alerta [7] and
the Early Warning Outbreak Response System (EWORS)
[8], two electronic early warning surveillance systems cur-
rently in place in resource-limited settings of Asia and the
Americas. Alerta monitors clinical diagnosis of manda-
tory-reporting conditions twice per week within the Peru-
vian Navy and Army since 2003, and is currently being
expanded to other countries in the Americas. Alerta is
implemented by the U.S. Naval Medical Research Center
Detachment (NMRCD), Peru and uses technology of
Voxiva S.R.L. EWORS monitors daily the signs and symp-
toms of patients with conditions of potential infectious
origin in sentinel hospitals, and is implemented in both
Southeast Asia and in Peru. EWORS was developed in
1999 by the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit #2
(NAMRU-2) in Indonesia, and implemented in collabora-
tion with the Ministries of Health in each country.
Numeric examples are drawn from the experiences of
Alerta in Peru and EWORS in Indonesia, Lao PDR and
Peru.
Proposed statistical analyses by stage
Planning stage
To demonstrate the feasibility of conducting surveillance,
often it is important to prove that surveillance will not
place a burden on healthcare personnel, and that timely
data can be generated with existing resources. This is par-
ticularly the case for syndromic surveillance systems that
use data that otherwise are not collected routinely. Pilot
tests of the data gathering forms of proposed new surveil-
lance systems should be conducted in advance (with >30
patients, ideally), in order to measure the mean data col-
lection and entry time, (i.e., time needed to obtain infor-
mation from a patient and to input data in a computer).
Averages and standard deviations are commonly esti-
mated, and for Alerta and EWORS data collection takes <1
minute per case and does not distract personnel or
patients. Data distribution time, on the other hand, esti-
mates the time required to send data from the surveillance
site to the central hub, usually via the Internet or by
phone. It can be estimated beforehand or can be recorded
automatically by the system itself, and usually takes <15
m for EWORS (daily) or Alerta (twice per week), showing
that little connectivity time is needed, and that dial-up
connections are sufficient in most surveillance sites.
Early implementation stage
Once surveillance is implemented, reporting rates esti-
mated as the percentage of days with reported data
(Table 1) should be routinely monitored at least until sur-
veillance sites reach acceptable reporting rates (often
>80%). In Peru, reporting rates are monitored weekly for
Alerta and EWORS, and these analyses showed thatBMC Proceedings 2008, 2(Suppl 3):S7 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1753-6561/2/S3/S7
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EWORS, a daily-reporting surveillance system, presents
substantial day-of-week variations in reporting rates, rang-
ing from an average of 87% on Saturdays to 92% on Tues-
days (Figure 1). We consider that weekly monitoring of
reporting rates can provide an appropriate balance
between effort and data quality, at least early in the imple-
mentation stage of a surveillance system. Sites with low
reporting rates (overall or localized in some specific days
of the week) usually receive additional oversight and re-
training, as chances of outbreak detection can be impaired
by poor data quality [9]. Timeliness is also crucial during
the early implementation stage, and its relevance has been
previously discussed in detail [3].
Completeness of reporting (percent of all eligible sub-
jects whose data was actually recorded in the surveil-
lance system) assesses the representativeness of the data
reported. Estimating this indicator often requires a labor-
intensive process involving sporadic site visits to manu-
ally evaluate the fraction of patients who visited a surveil-
lance site seeking medical attention and were actually
included in the surveillance system. EWORS and Alerta
sites evaluated in Peru showed completeness rates ranging
from 66% to 90% (Araujo-Castillo R, personal communi-
cation 2007).
Once a steady, satisfactory level of reporting completeness
and timeliness is achieved, the caseload and patient pro-
file should be described (Table 2) to better understand
the population under surveillance and identify features
potentially relevant for outbreak detection. The patient
profiles in small district clinics can differ substantially
from cases seen at reference hospitals, and important dif-
ferences can also be observed between surveillance in chil-
dren versus adult populations. Each of these
subpopulations can also help to identify different types of
outbreaks. Similarly, analyses of patient profiles could
show that cases in certain surveillance sites travel fre-
quently, which could result in higher risk of disease intro-
duction in those sites. This would therefore require more
careful, intensified surveillance for potential aberrations.
Finally, analysis of patient profiles can also point out
sources of systematic variability in the caseload that need
to be addressed by outbreak detection algorithms, espe-
cially those acting on short periods such as day-of-week
effects (Figure 2).
Consolidation stage
Syndromic surveillance often allows the evaluation of
large numbers of health conditions or combinations of
them. For example, EWORS collects 29 signs and symp-
toms in South East Asia and 33 in Peru, which we have
observed can be present in hundreds of combinations.
Monitoring that many symptom combinations every
week is unmanageable and impractical. In situations like
this, where too many symptom combinations or other
potential outcomes exist and can be surveyed, data anal-
yses can target a few carefully selected outcomes to
monitor routinely in order to minimize false positive
alerts and avoid an unnecessary burden on public health
professionals. For example, during the patient profile
analyses conducted with EWORS data, three clearly
defined combinations of symptoms (that we will refer to
as 'syndromes') consistently accounted for nearly all cases
reported in different countries (Table 3). This finding lim-
its the need to monitor the nearly countless numbers of
other possible combinations of symptoms. Some combi-
Average daily reporting rates (percent days with data  reported) across EWORS sites in Peru, 2005–2006 Figure 1
Average daily reporting rates (percent days with data 
reported) across EWORS sites in Peru, 2005–2006. Surveil-
lance sites do not open on Sundays.
Table 1: Average and range of reporting rate (percent days with 
data reported) across sites, EWORS 2000 – 2006.
Country Overall percent reporting rates (range)
Indonesia 96 (91 – 100)
Lao PDR 93 (88 – 94)
Peru* 89 (69 – 100)
* Surveillance of signs and symptoms, conducted from Monday to 
Saturday only.
Table 2: Main sociodemographic characteristics of cases 
surveyed, EWORS 2000 – 2006.
Characteristic Indonesia Lao PDR Peru
Male (%) 55.6 52.6 52.3
Median age (years) 7 14 3
Traveled recently (%) 0.1 6.1 2.5
Patients per day 27 33 4BMC Proceedings 2008, 2(Suppl 3):S7 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1753-6561/2/S3/S7
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nations of febrile, respiratory and gastroenteric syn-
dromes may be more strongly correlated, clinically
relevant and frequent, deserving special attention and
probably requiring to be analyzed as a single entity. For
example, observations of multiple simultaneous spikes in
the frequency of fever and diarrhea in one Indonesian site
(Figure 3) suggest the occurrence of outbreaks of infec-
tious diarrhea. A more direct approach to deal with multi-
ple possible symptoms and their combinations is to
define and monitor the occurrence of these 'syndromes' as
individual entities. Alternatively, a more sophisticated
approach could use multivariate methods to analyze each
individual symptom (data stream) and adjust for the cor-
relation between symptoms.
As this article places specific emphasis on early warning
outbreak detection surveillance systems, one of the
expected outcomes of such systems will often be the actual
detection of an aberration or potential outbreak. The per-
formance of outbreak detection algorithms is measured
by their sensitivity (percent detected of all outbreaks),
specificity (often expressed by the average time between
warnings) and detection timeliness (delay between out-
break onset and detection). Numerous algorithms exist
and abundant literature describe their performance
[6,10], although with known limitations: 1) performance
assessments still rely on simulations instead of 'real' out-
breaks, 2) measuring 'true' performance requires outbreak
investigations and parallel detection systems as a gold
standard, and 3) evidence from developing countries
remains remarkably limited.
Discussion
Researchers conducting statistical analyses applied to dis-
ease surveillance systems often place more interest on out-
break detection algorithms [2,4,6], describing in
substantially less detail the systems' performance, data
quality and the epidemiological profile of the population
under surveillance. Surveillance conducted in resource-
limited settings, however, often suffers from low reporting
coverage and data completeness, which in some cases may
be insufficient to support accurate, timely outbreak detec-
tion. These operational issues must be addressed before
the performance of the system as a whole can be assessed.
Although our analyses and evidence are limited to devel-
oping country settings, surveillance systems in more
developed countries would probably also benefit from
increased analysis of data quality and system performance
beyond aberration detection.
Outbreak detection algorithms should match the charac-
teristics of the surveillance data available, and only a care-
ful analysis of existing surveillance data may reveal
unique features that need to be addressed. A few examples
include the presence and magnitude of day-of-week
effects, their effect in comparison with seasonal variation,
the most frequent disease outcomes among the popula-
Table 3: Most frequent symptoms and syndromes and percent patients affected, EWORS, 2000 – 2006.
Symptom/syndrome Indonesia Lao PDR Perú
Most frequent symptoms
First Fever (71) Fever (75) Fever (80)
Second Cough (52) Cough (44) Cough (63)
Third Cold (46) Headache (37) Rhinorrhea (36)
Fourth Diarrhea (17) Cold (27) Malaise (31)
Fifth Vomiting (16) Malaise (25) Sore throat (25)
Most frequent syndromes
Febrile 71 75 80
Respiratory* 47 51 70
Gastroenteric** 34 25 31
Any of these three 96 89 96
The numbers represent the percent of patients with the symptom or syndrome, respectively 
* Cough or sore throat, ** Diarrhea or vomiting.
Average number of cases surveyed by day of the week,  EWORS Lao PDR 2003–6 Figure 2
Average number of cases surveyed by day of the week, 
EWORS Lao PDR 2003–6.BMC Proceedings 2008, 2(Suppl 3):S7 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1753-6561/2/S3/S7
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tion, and the socio-demographic units within the popula-
tion.
Surveillance in the context of developing countries is
unique in many aspects. Few surveillance systems cur-
rently exist, and entire sub-groups of populations such as
the military are often excluded [5]. The implementation
of new systems such as Alerta and EWORS provides an
opportunity to look critically at the surveillance system
evaluation framework and expand the current arsenal of
evaluation procedures. As current pandemic threats [11]
and international regulations demand more extensive sur-
veillance [12], the evaluation of new systems should
begin earlier on their implementation in order to enhance
their overall chances of success.
Conclusion
Statistical methods for disease surveillance have focused
mainly on the performance of outbreak detection algo-
rithms and have not paid sufficient attention to the data
quality and representativeness, two factors that are espe-
cially important in developing countries. Whether the
final endpoint of surveillance is outbreak detection, situa-
tional awareness, or estimation of trends, these aims can-
not be accomplished without adequate intermediate
outcomes such as reporting coverage, data quality and
completeness. We advocate the use of a more holistic
approach to statistical analyses in which indicators relate
to the entire surveillance process. Assessment of data qual-
ity using a diverse mix of data sources and analytical
methods is key during each stage of its implementation.
Careful, close monitoring of selected indicators is also
crucial to evaluate whether systems are reaching their pro-
Daily number of cases of fever and diarrhea showing simultaneous increases, EWORS Indonesia, 2001 – 2003 Figure 3
Daily number of cases of fever and diarrhea showing simultaneous increases, EWORS Indonesia, 2001 – 2003.Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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posed goals at each stage. A more balanced, diverse anal-
ysis of surveillance systems data is essential in the current
context, as new surveillance systems are implemented in
response to pandemic threats and the recently updated
international health regulations.
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